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Nikolaos Gkikas1, Julian R. Hill2, John H. Richardson3 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Emergency Brake Assist (EBA), Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and 
alternative instantiations of intelligent vehicle control systems aspire to support the driver in 
controlling the vehicle and alleviate the incidents that would lead to collisions and injury. 
This paper resets to zero and based on data from the On-The-Spot (OTS) accident study 
challenges the capability of active safety systems to aim at the sources of longitudinal control 
failures. The road user interactions file from 3024 road accidents in Thames Valley and 
Nottinghamshire in UK was analysed. Interactions where “failure to stop” or “sudden 
braking” is the precipitating factor are analysed and the main contributory factors are 
identified. Some of those factors are addressed by current and coming technologies – like low 
road friction, excessive speed and close following, but significantly neglect to address other 
common ones – like distraction, failure to judge other person’s path, failure to look,  and 
“look but did not see” instances. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Rear end collisions and are the most common type of road accidents and fortunately the ones 
with fewer fatalities (Fatality analysis reporting system (FARS) web-based encyclopedia. 
data files and procedures to analyse them.2005; Evans, 2004; Lee, 2006). However because 
of its prevalence, the cost of property damage (Blincoe et al., 2002) and the long term cost of 
injury (Barnes & Thomas, 2006; Barnes, 2006), the impact on society is comparable, if not 
greater, than loss of control/single car accidents – which are associated with more fatalities. 
The latter type of collision is associated with failure in lateral controllability while rear shunts 
relate with longitudinal control failures at the basic level of the driving task. 
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There are many different descriptions and models about the driving task depending on the 
context in which the author develops it. From the early 40s till today driving has been 
described as a safe field of travel in which drivers adjust their speed and direction avoiding 
hazards and moving towards their destination (Gibson & Crooks, 1938), as an intermittent 
monitoring task (Senders, Kristofferson, Levison, Dietrich, & Ward, 1967) and other time-
based descriptions (Godthelp, Milgram, & Blaauw, 1984; Van Winsum & Godthelp, 1996; 
Van Winsum & Heino, 1996; Van Winsum & Brouwer, 1997; van Winsum, Brookhuis, & de 
Waard, 2000/1), as a threat avoidance (Fuller, 1984), and finally as control actions used to 
adjust the state of the vehicle in response to sic perturbations (D. H. Weir & McRuer, 1970; 
D. H. Weir & Mcruer, 1973). All the above descriptions, no matter the differences among 
them, suggest a basic level of the driving task consisting of the longitudinal and the lateral 
control of the vehicle. This is instantiated through manipulation of brake/throttle pedals and 
steering wheel inputs respectively. 
 
Bearing in mind the notion above, manufacturers and system developers suggest a series of 
vehicle systems supposed to help the driver in their task. Generally, there are four main types 
of systems already in production. These are the Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and the likes, 
Electronic Stability Program (ESP) and the likes, Lane Change Support (LCS) and the likes, 
and Emergency Brake Assist (EBA). Details about the functionality and the notion of the 
above is widely available (BOSCH, 2000; Society for Automotive Engineers, 1999; Delphi 
active safety products for automotive manufacturers.; Honda safety - active safety.). As 
active safety systems, their effect in accident mitigation has recently been supported by some 
statistical evidence (Breuer, Faulhaber, Frank, & Gleissner, 2007; Lie, Tingvall, Krafft, & 
Kullgren, 2006; Page, Foret-Bruno, & Cuny, ; Thomas, 2006). However, those macroscopic 
studies feature all the limitations of field correlation based analyses – loads of possible 
confounding variables and methodological inability to infer causation (Breakwell, Hammond, 
& Fife-Schaw, 2000).  
 
Considering the above, an examination of the characteristics of “failure to stop” accidents 
from the On-the-Spot Accident (OTS) Investigation study (Hill, Thomas, Smith, & Byard, 
2006) was carried out. OTS, as its name implies in a project run in cooperation with the 
police authorities in two main areas of UK; namely Thames Valley and Nottinghamshire. 
Accident investigators are able to arrive on the spot within minutes after an accident has 
happened and collect volatile data that would otherwise be lost.  
 
The history behind OTS 
 
Data on road accidents has been collected since at least 1909 (Hillard, Logan, & Fildes, 
2005). However, it was not until 1949 that a nationwide system for accident data collection 
was introduced, namely STATS19. The original system collected both objective factors 
(speed limit, time, weather etc.) as well as contributory factors, i.e. the factors which the 
reporting officer on the accident scene believed that had contributed to accident occurrence. 
The system has been reviewed and improvised every five years since its introduction. After 
some arguments about the reliability of the subjective nature of contributory factors, such 
data ceased to be a national requirement in 1959 review. Collection and central collation of 
objective data continued as before. However, in 1994 half the country’s police forces still 
used some kind of contributory factors in accident data collection (Broughton, 1997).  
 
That year’s report (Maycock, 1995) classifies in three broad groups the contributory data 
collected by the police forces at the time. Some police forces opted to record a simple list of 
 2
causes, while other preferred to use a list of contributory factors, tailored to the level of 
flexibility considered necessary for individual local users. That report persuaded the 
Department for Transport to commission the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) to 
develop and test a prototype system for the collection of contributory factors data. TRL 
elaborated on the previous hierarchical system and presented a “new system for recording 
contributory factors in road accidents” (Broughton, 1997). The suggested system was an 
amalgam of the theoretical model suggested by Leeds University during the late 80’s 
(Carsten, Tight, Southwell, & Plows, 1989), plus the aggregated experience and practical 
needs indicated by the police forces. Therefore, a two-level hierarchy with the following 
terminology was developed: 
• Precipitating factors are the failures and manoeuvres that immediately led to the 
accident. 
• Contributory factors are the causes for these failures and manoeuvres. A recorded 
contributory factor always relates to a precipitating factor that has already been 
recorded. 
In its early version, the system was flexible enough to allow up to three precipitating factors 
to be chosen and up to three contributory factors per precipitating factor. Factors had also to 
be entered in decreasing order of importance. The authors suggested that the hierarchical 
model has the advantage that it allows for the same factors to be recorded as in the case of a 
single tier approach, however in application it imposes a discipline upon the investigator and 
thus leads to a more reliable coding.  
 
Police involvement was substantial in the development as well as in the support of the 
project. During the first stage of its development police accident files were examined to 
decide whether such system was applicable in real world incidents. This was followed up by 
interviewing and consultation with police officers 
 
The finally tested version allowed for only one precipitating factor to be selected as only a 
few of the accident files revisited in the previous step included more than one and 
additionally the form design becomes simpler this way. The option “other” was introduced to 
allow flexibility and also check the completeness of the coverage in the current form. This 
allowed for new factors to be incorporated within the rapidly changing transport 
environment. The final innovation introduced was the “definite, probable, possible” option 
for the investigator to rate each contributory factor he/she so chooses. 
 
After consecutive reviews in the year 2000 (Neilson & Condon, 2000) and 2002 (Wilding, 
2002) suggested itemised amendments and especially the latter acknowledged the internal 
“blame machine” of the system, as it tended to lay blame on an individual and was totally 
inappropriate for accidents were there was contribution from multiple road users. The issues 
identified in the review in conjunction with the previous paper by Neilson and Condon lead 
the Department for Transport to commission the Transportation Research Group at 
Southampton University to go one step further and make suggestions to the Standing 
Committee on Road Accident Statistics (SCRAS) for the improvement of the contributory 
system. The subsequent report (Hickford & Hall, 2004), among other recommendations, 
suggested a revised form for collecting contributory data. However for ease of use, after 
consultation with the local authorities and the police, a different layout was adopted by 
SCRAS. The outcome was the STATS19 (2005) contributory factors form now in use, 
including seventy-six contributory factors and also an option to report “other factor” by text 
description. The factors are grouped in five main categories: road environment contributed 
(nine factors); vehicle defects (six factors); driver/rider only (forty-seven factors); pedestrian 
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only (ten factors); and four factors for special codes (stolen vehicle, vehicle in course of 
crime, emergency vehicle on call, vehicle door open/closed negligently). The driver/rider 
category is further subdivided into five subcategories: injudicious action, error or reaction, 
impairment or distraction, behaviour or inexperience and vision affected (by). The reporting 
officer can select up to six factors from the grid, relevant to the accident. Previously 
suggested three and four-point scales of confidence are now substituted by a simple two-point 
scale: the officer indicates for each factor whether he/she considers it “very likely” or just 
“possible”. The system allows for more than one factor to be related to same road user and 
for the same factor to be related to more than one road user, if appropriate. This allows the 
police officer sufficient flexibility to include the necessary details in a concise manner. 
 
 
However since the year 2000, in parallel and based on the experience of accident data coding 
from STATS19 and microscopic on-the-spot studies in Germany (Otte, 1999) and France 
(Girard, 1993), OTS project commenced in the UK (Hill et al., 2006). Against the traditional 
retrospective studies, where accident data is collected long after an accident occurred the 
OTS offers the ability to collect invaluable data which would otherwise be lost such as 
vehicle rest position, debris locations, weather conditions, road surface conditions, tyre 
pressures, temporary changes in the road environment at the time of impact, immediate driver 
and witness descriptions. In addition to this, it includes data which is collected retrospectively 
in days or months after the accident (road signs, impact damage on vehicles, road dimensions 
etc.). 
 
The procedure on the scene starts with the arrival of the investigation team at the scene of an 
accident. The serving police officer on the OTS team makes contact with the police officer in 
charge of the accident scene and briefs him about the intended activities of the investigators. 
After fulfilment of protocols and safety issues, the team makes contact with the people and 
the various elements involved in the crash. Data is coded in a database of 200 forms with 
over 3000 variables. Within those, as with any accident in the UK, a contributory factors 
form similar to the STATS19 one described earlier is included. Thus accident causation is 
coded in two levels: a precipitating factor and up to six contributory ones. 
 
OTS cases are further analysed to determine more complex descriptions of accident causation 
in terms of possible interactions between the active road users. A system called “interactions” 
has been developed to allow analysis and recording of one or more interactions between each 
road user and his environment to provide description of events leading to impact at any 
degree of necessary complexity. This allows acquisition of information at a microscopic 
level, where each person can be involved, affect and be affected by multiple agents of the 
road traffic environment. All information is completely anonymous and does not include 
personal details or other documents. The project has been operational since the year 2000 and 
is now in its third phase. 
 
ANALYSIS OF CASES WHERE “FAILURE TO STOP” OR “SUDDEN BRAKING” 
INITIATED THE ACCIDENT 
 
With regard to vehicle control, there are two types of failures coded as precipitating factors in 
the database directly pertinent to longitudinal controllability. The first is a basic failure to 
stop the vehicle when necessary, and the second is stopping the vehicle at an inappropriate 
time or stopping in an abrupt manner. Therefore, the current study examined as a first step 
only the accident cases where “failure to stop” or “sudden braking” were the identified 
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precipitating factor of the accident. However the data presented below takes advantage of the 
microscopic detail the multiple interactions/road user/case available. Thus, the following 
analysis is based on 1099 interactions in “failure to stop” accidents and 152 interactions in 
“sudden braking” accidents. The database has been compared against STATS19 data and 
validated as representative of accidents in the UK (Hill et al., 2006). All results presented 
hereafter has been tested for asymptotic significance (chi-square test) and found below the 
criterion a=0.01. 
 
“Failure to stop” 
 
Failure of a driver/vehicle to stop in time to avoid collision with another road user or object is 
identified as the precipitating factor in 301 cases investigated by the OTS team. “Failure to 
stop” therefore defines a unique set of accidents where that is the single, precipitating factor 
causing the accident. Clearly all accidents are in some way the result of a failure to stop 
before the collision occurs, but the sub-set under study here represent drivers who were 
considered to be the predominate, precipitating cause of their accident by failing to stop their 
vehicle in time. Each “failure to stop” will have been assigned as the precipitating factor 
following an accident investigation to eliminate other possible precipitating factors, such as 
for example, the driver travelling too fast, or a pedestrian stepping into the road. This is 
therefore a set of drivers who were not able to stop for a variety of personal psychological or 
other reasons. There will of course be other drivers who did not stop before collision (all the 
other drivers in the database). This study focuses, however, on the unique group for which 
“failure to stop” was the precipitating factor, together with an additional “sudden braking” 
group, as explained below.  This study does not therefore attempt to consider all possible 
reasons for drivers failing to stop in time to avoid their accident. 
 
Experience of accident investigation in high-hazard industry, aerospace, space and road 
traffic applications (Kirwan, 1994; Reason, 1990; Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 
2003; Whittingham, 2004) indicates that we must first define a precipitating factor, but that it 
is equally important to then understand the additional contributory factors. 
Therefore it is necessary to look further into the factors that contributed in the occurrence of 
an accident and not only focus the predominant factor that triggered the accident. Table 1 
presents the predominant contributory factors in cases where “failure to stop” is 
acknowledged as the single precipitating factor. In a previous study based on the (coded by 
the police officer) Contributory Factors 2005 data (Gkikas, Hill, & Richardson, 2007), 
driver’s “too close” car following strategy is identified as the most common contributory 
factor in accidents followed by failures to obey traffic signals and overspeeding for the 
conditions present. Cognitive failures - to look and to judge other paths - and inappropriate 
reactions - sudden braking - are also commonly found in such accidents. 
 
Table 1. The predominant contributory factors in accidents of “failure to stop” 
 (Gkikas et al., 2007) 
 Factor Percent Cumulative percent 
Following too close 26.5 26.5 
Disobeyed traffic signal 15 41.5 
Travelling too fast 12.8 54.3 
Careless, reckless or in a hurry 11.3 65.6 
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Failed to look 8.2 73.8 
Exceed speed limit 5 78.8 
Failed to judge other person’s path 3.9 82.7 
Sudden braking 2.1 84.8 
Slippery road 2 86.8 
Stolen vehicle 1.6 88.4 
Aggressive driving 1.5 89.9 
Learner driver 1 90.9 
Total 90.94   
 
 
Further examination of the data coded by OTS investigators in the accident causation files 
reveals a more detailed picture. Additional contribution is founded in psychological factors 
such as distraction, panic behaviour, nervousness and inattention (tables 2, 3). 
 
Table 2. Contribution of cognitive failures in "failure to stop" accidents 
 % Definitely 
causative 
% Probably 
causative 
% Possibly 
causative 
Total 
Inattention 19.5 30.6 23.2 73.3
Failure to judge other person's 
path or speed 
15.8 8.8 7 31.6
Failure to look 5.6 8.7 14.4 28.7
Lack of judgement of own path 7.8 7.4 11.5 26.7
Look but did not see 2.2 7.4 14.5 24.1
 
Table 3. Contribution of emotional factors in "failure to stop" accidents 
  % 
Definitely 
causative
% 
Probably 
causative
% 
Possibly 
causative 
Total
Aggressive driving 0.6 3.6 4.2 8.4
In a hurry 1.7 8.8 8.8 19.3
Carelessness, reckless or thoughtless 18.6 17.7 14.1 50.4
 
In terms of who is involved in such accidents, most are male drivers – 52% against 36.6% 
female and 11% unspecified – and most are car occupants (table 4).  
 
One of the common misconceptions is that accidents triggered by a failure to stop a vehicle in 
time are only rear end collisions happening during car – following settings. Common 
collision types associated with such accidents include crossing, merging, right turns, 
pedestrian crossings and more (Gkikas et al., 2007).  
                                                 
4 The rest 9.1% consists of factors with contribution below 1%. 
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Table 4. The distribution of road users in "failure to stop" accidents 
 
Road users involved in “failure to stop” 
accidents 
Car occupants 80.3% LGV occupants 3.5% 
HGV occupants 3.1% 
Pedestrian 1.3% 
Cyclist 1.7% 
Motorcyclist 0.9% 
Bus occupant 0.9% 
 
 
Sudden braking 
 
Starting from where we left with the previous type of accidents, a similar variety of collisions 
applies here as well (Gkikas et al., 2007). Rear end collisions are the most common case, but 
not the only. Loss off control in cornering (left), missing intersections, loss of control on 
curves and going off road are common collisions initiated by the sudden braking of a leading 
vehicle. In total 18% of the cases initiated by sudden brake application lead to collisions of 
these types. Another 7.9% of those cases involved side- and head-on collisions during 
overtaking, while an interesting 5.3 % includes collision with miscellaneous objects fell from 
moving vehicle. 
 
In terms of injury outcomes, as was the case in “failure to stop”, sudden braking initiates 
accidents with small amount of fatalities and serious injuries. The biggest part of road users 
remains uninjured or leave the crash scene with minor injuries. However this does not include 
any long-term effects of the accident occurrence. Most road users were car occupants as 
previously, however there is a greater proportion of LGV, HGV, and bus occupants as well as 
motorcyclists and cyclists (table 5). Among those most are male (71.7%), 18.4% are female 
and the rest remained unspecified in the file. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of driver/riders involved in “sudden braking” accidents 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Car occupant 111 73.0 73.0 73.0 
LGV occupant 14 9.2 9.2 82.2 
HGV occupant 10 6.6 6.6 88.8 
Bus occupant 4 2.6 2.6 91.4 
Cyclist 4 2.6 2.6 94.1 
Motorcyclist 9 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 152 100.0 100.0   
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The primary contributory factors that nested the accidents according to Contributory Factors 
(STATS19) 2005 form are presented in table 6. Sudden brake application of another vehicle 
is the most common contributory factor leading to the sudden brake application of the vehicle 
that leads to the immediate collision, suggesting a transition effect of the phenomenon that 
leads to the accident. Too close car-following behaviour is associated too and is the second 
most common contributory factor, followed by failures to judge others path and inadequate or 
masked signs. Other factors include overspeeding and distractions are common too as in the 
“failure to stop” cases, while a case by case examination of each case file, revealed an 
element of loss of control in some cases. That is the tendency of sudden braking to be 
llowed by loss of vehicle control and most of those cases were fatal. 
 
Table 6. The main contributory factors in "sudden braking" accidents (Gkikas et al., 2007) 
 Frequency Percent 
fo
sudden braking 54 35.5 
following too close 37 24.3 
failed to judge other person’s path or speed 12 7.9 
inadequate or masked signs or road markings 7 4.6 
careless, reckless or in a hurry 7 4.6 
exceeded speed limit 5 3.3 
distraction outside vehicle 4 2.6 
aggressive driving 4 2.6 
road layout (e.g. bend, hill, narrow carriageway) 4 2.6 
travelling too fast for conditions 4 2.6 
Animal or object in carriageway 3 2.0 
slippery road (due to weather) 3 2.0 
Vision affected by road layout (e.g. bend, winding road, hill crest) 3 2.0 
junction overshoot 3 2.0 
Cyclist entering road from footway 1 .7 
failed to look properly 1 .7 
Total 152 100.0 
 
In parallel, further examination of the cases by OTS investigators reveals increased 
contribution of emotional (table 7) and cognitive factors (table 8) , while contribution of car 
following and speed behaviour (table 9) is about the same level as in the National Causation 
data. Carelessness/recklessness/thoughtlessness was found contributing between 15.8% – 
32.2 % of interactions, panic behaviour between 7.2% and 23.6%, aggressive driving 
between 13.2% - 15.8%, while nervousness/uncertainty contributed from 2% to 11.9%. 
Inattention was a major factor not immediately identified in the Contributory Factors 
(STATS19) 2005 form. Its contribution was found between 9.2% - 42%. Failure to judge 
other road users’ path or speed had a contribution between 15.1% and 29.6%, higher than the 
STATS19 form suggests, while lack of judgement for own path ranged between 2.6 and 11.2 
percent, and “look but did not see” failures had a 0-8.5% contribution. The important 
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contribution of too close car following found previously (table 6) was confirmed (16.4%-
34.8%) as w
 
Table 7: Contribution of emotional factor re ccidents 
%defin
causati
%proba
causati
%pos
causati
tota
ell as the contribution of speeding (5.9%-14.4%). 
s in "failu  to stop" a
 itely 
ve 
bly 
ve 
sibly 
ve 
l 
careless/reckless/thoughtless 3 13.2 32.3 15.8 .3
Panic behaviour 7.2 7.2 9.2 23.6 
aggressive driving 13.2 0 2.6 15.8 
n  ervous or uncertain 2 5.3 4.6 11.9
 
Table 8: Contribution of cogni s to idents 
%defini
causa
%prob
causati
%pos
causati
total 
tive failure in "failure  stop" acc
 tely 
tive 
ably 
ve 
sibly 
ve 
inattention 9.2 16.4 16.4 42 
failure to judge others path or 
speed 
15.1 7.9 6.6 29.6 
lack of judgement of own path 2.6 0 8.6 11.2 
look, but did not see 0 2.6 5.9 8.5 
 
Table 9: Contribution of tactic c- vi lure to stop” accidents 
%defin
causati
%prob
causati
%poss
causati
tota
al/strategi level beha our in “fai
 itely 
ve 
ably 
ve 
ibly 
ve 
l 
following to
close 
o 1 16.4 2.5 5.9 34.8 
excessive 
speed 
5.9 4.6 3.9 14.4 
 
 
Road user reaction 
 
Taking into account how critical the human input is in the driver-vehicle-road environment 
system, road user reaction is a necessary bit of information, very hard to extract accurately 
ough. In “failure to stop” cases, almost half the road users have no significant reaction as 
the ac
 
Table 10.  Percentage distribution of road users' reaction in "failure to stop" cases 
Freque Percent Valid Percent 
th
cident phase commences (table 10). 
 ncy 
No sig brkng, strng or acc 518 47.1 48.2 
Accelerated (also steering somewhat to the Right) 9 .8 .8 
Steered Right (also Accelerating somewhat) 
eration 
 
ng 399 36.3 37.1 
34 3.1 3.2 
13 1.2 1.2 
3 .3 .3 
Steered Right without significant braking or accel 10 .9 .9 
Steered Right (also Braking somewhat) 13 1.2 1.2 
Braked (also steering somewhat to the Right) 29 2.6 2.7 
Braked without significant change in steeri
Braked (also steering somewhat to the Left) 
Steered Left (also Braking somewhat) 
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Steered Left without significant braking or acceleration 2 .2 .2 
Steered Left (also Accelerating somewhat) 3 .3 .3 
Accelerated (also steering somewhat to the Left) 
rated without significant change in steering 
2.3 
100.0 
Missing System 24 2.2   
Total 1099 100.0   
12 1.1 1.1 
Accele 5 .5 .5 
Unknown 25 2.3 
Total 1075 97.8 
 
 
n “sudden braking” cases the proportion of road users that aI pplied brakes is much greater 
an in the previous cases. Combined steering and braking inputs consist about 15% of 
act
 
 
Table 11. Percentage distribution of road users’ reaction in “sudden braking” cases 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
th
re ions while steering only reactions are minimal (table 11). 
 
No sig brkng, strng or acc: st
to orig line o
ayd clse 
r curve 
37 24.3 24.7 
Steered Right (also Braking 
somewhat) 
2 1.3 1.3 
Braked (also steering somewhat to the 11 7.2 7.3 
Right) 
Braked without significant change in 92 60.5 61.3 
steering 
Braked (also steering somewhat to the 
Left) 
3 2.0 2.0 
Steered Left (also Braking somewhat) 1 .7 .7 
Steere
or acce
d Left without significant braking 
leration 
2 1.3 1.3 
Unknown/missing data 4 2.6 2.6 
Total 152 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Starting from the very first table of the results, one thing is transparent: road accidents are not 
transparent events in their causation. There are so many different variables affecting each one 
of those events, changing from place to place, time to time, culture to culture, vehicle to 
vehicle, person to person. Close car-following behaviour, non-adherence to traffic rules and 
speeding contribute to about 50 % of “failures to stop” and is logical to focus on; however 
there is another 50% which does not includes the above factors. Cognitive failures and errors 
of road user judgement have also been identified to play a significant part. This comes in 
ccordance with a ethological studies suggesting compromised decision-making ability 
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particularly common in intersection crashes (Preusser, Williams, Ferguson, Ulmer, & 
Weinstein, 1998). 
 
Inattention is identified as a very important factor in failures to stop the vehicle in time (table 
3). As this is not the first study to identify such phenomenon (Knipling et al., 1993), the 
introduction of more and more in-vehicle devices ranging from simple music players to 
internet and e-mail facilities can easily be approached with scepticism. It is hard not to 
cknowledge that the additional workload imposed by a vehicle interior full of “bleeps” and 
cases examined are lower than European averages of road user 
asualties (European Commission), still there is about 20% of non-car occupants and vehicles 
 multiple numbers of road users per case combined with the great 
roportion of contribution of sudden braking to others’ sudden braking suggests a strong 
 (Muttart, 2005), although in that case the methodology was constrained in the 
onitoring of an urban junction only. Overall, the high proportion of non-evasive reactions 
ises considerations about the value of investments in systems based on driver braking (such 
s EBA). 
a
“buzzes” magnifies the risk for such accidents. There is a great deal of work necessary to 
incorporate all those components in the vehicle environment without side-effects. 
 
In terms of road user involvement in those cases, it is clear that there is more than just car 
drivers to be considered for a safe road environment. Although the respected proportions of 
non-car drivers in the 
c
to be considered. Similar proportions apply in the case of “sudden braking” with an extra 
involvement of LGVs.  
 
In “sudden braking” cases although a reasonable amount of contribution is identified in too 
close car-following behaviour (table 7), speeding related factors have very low numbers 
compared to the previous tables about cases of “failure to stop”. The cognitive factors are at 
stake here in significant numbers as well, as the contribution percentages of road user failures 
to judge other’s path, sudden braking as contributory factor itself and factors related to visual 
perception suggest. The
p
systematic domino effect in those cases. The reaction of one driver comes in accordance with 
the reaction of another. 
 
This systematic phenomenon is supported by the distribution of driver reactions in respective 
cases. In the case of “sudden braking” accidents, braking is the most common reaction of 
road users. Only a quarter of the drivers have no significant reaction in the accident sequence. 
In the case of “failure to stop” initiated accidents, almost half the road users did not even 
apply brakes (at least not significantly). When some reaction took place, it was only brake 
application most of the time. This result comes somewhat in contrast with a field study that 
suggests brake application in tandem with steering wheel inputs as a common evasive action 
of drivers
m
ra
a
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: WHAT ACTIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS DO WE NEED? 
 
Facing the variety of factors and the complexity of the interactions that contribute to an 
accident it is hard to avoid scepticism about the degree in which the current automotive 
systems address accident causation. Although most of them are based on basic notions about 
the main factors that trigger an accident, in each of the tables presented in the results section 
an array of factors which are not addressed or are addressed insufficiently can be found. 
While it could be supported that factors like failures to stop should be ameliorated by EBA, 
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car following distances/times could be controlled by ACC and Intelligent Speed Adaptation 
could minimise speeding, similar development cannot be observed to address “failures to 
look”, failures of judgement, driver motivation and emotional conditions, inappropriate 
reactions (sudden braking) or driver distraction and inattention. Specifically for the last two 
problems there should be two things accounted: first, the need to specify systems that 
improvise the deceleration-properties of the single vehicle but at the same time are 
harmonised with driver intentions and allow some slack for the communication of vehicle 
imminent status to other road users. Second, as the in-vehicle environment becomes more and 
more demanding visually, manually, acoustically, cognitively and/or tacitly, there is a need to 
integrate those elements in future systems specification. This is a major problem in modern 
vehicle systems design, as distraction affects lateral controllability as well (Gkikas & 
Richardson, 2007), which is associated with the most deadly type of accident – loss of 
control/road departure (Lee, 2006). Safety systems integration with HMI controllers of in-
ehicle devices looks promising in this area (Amditis, Kussmann, Polychronopoulos, 
ty in Sweden adopts this approach in accident investigation with 
e aim at active safety systems specifically (Ljung, Fagerlind, Lövsund, & Sandin, 2007). 
 primitive phase. It comes naturally to wonder how an x specification (stability, cruise 
ontrol, brakes assist etc.) system can accommodate for the capabilities and limitations of the 
variety in skills and limitations similar to the general population.  
als, 
f at 
University and TRL Ltd who have helped to establish and carry out this 
project. The views expressed in this paper belong to the authors and are not necessarily those 
f the Department for Transport, Highways Agency, Nottinghamshire Police or Thames 
v
Engstrom, & Andreone, 2006), however such systems are still in conceptual stages/early 
development. 
 
It would be unfair not to acknowledge that conceptually ACC and EBA seem ideal against 
longitudinal control failures. The problem is that they currently only touch on the surface of 
the problem (longitudinal control failure) and fail to address the core factors behind it. Failing 
to go below the surface (precipitating factors) only makes the problem appear in a slightly 
different form (Hollnagel, 2004; Wagenaar & Reason, 1990). Unfortunately, experience in 
high-hazard industries has widely indicated this through horrific disasters accompanying 
safety design that follows this approach (Hollnagel, 2004; Whittingham, 2004).  A concurrent 
work in Chalmers Universi
th
Hopefully, this system will fill in the gaps of traditional accident investigation – such as the 
one this study is based on. 
 
Overall, there is a need for more interdisciplinary work in order to constantly harmonise the 
three elements of road transport: human, vehicle and road environment. Furthermore, there is 
a need to lean towards the first element, the driver and design for them, according to them. 
This is a generally accepted principle. However this is rarely sufficiently applied, as 
“averages” are far from accommodating most drivers and customisation in active safety is in 
a
c
real driving population, with 
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